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Securing Health Care Information Systems 
using Visualisation Techniques 
Abstract 
Health care information systems form the backbone of health care infrastructures and are increasingly 
reliant on medical devices to capture and transmit data. These devices, however, are vulnerable to 
attacks from the digital domain. The number of differing medical devices and information systems 
interacting with one another in new and increasingly less secure and disparate ways creates new 
challenges in information systems security. This work-in-progress paper presents a system design and 
methodology for modelling data interactions and data flow within the health care infrastructure. The 
system will increase situational awareness for users of information systems and promote stronger 
cyber security best practices and policies within this rapidly evolving landscape. 
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1. Introduction 
Critical information infrastructures lay the foundation for an advanced society. The 
safety, security and comfort of ordinary people rely on critical infrastructures every 
day. Food & water distribution, power supply, finance, military defence, 
manufacturing, transport, government services and healthcare (Merabti et al. 2011), 
are all notable examples of goods and services provided. These information 
infrastructures have become increasingly dependent on Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) to facilitate communication and automate 
services (Eusgeld & Nan 2009). However, as with any other network, the 
interconnected critical infrastructures are now more vulnerable to cyber-attackers. An 
attack on one infrastructure can have a direct impact on multiple others (Board 1998).  
Critical infrastructures operate, and are increasingly being dispersed, over large 
geographic areas (Macdermott et al. 2013). The result is an increased vulnerability on 
critical infrastructures to cyber-attacks from external sources (Walker et al. 2011). 
Healthcare is an essential part of the national critical infrastructure network (Chalmers 
et al. 2015). Of the four critical infrastructures (safety, mission, business and 
security), hospital infrastructures are a mission-critical infrastructure. Damage to 
network communications and the loss of patient data would have a detrimental impact 
on the health provision, potentially resulting in patient death or theft of sensitive data 
(Sawand et al. 2014). Additionally, many lifesaving medical devices, used by health 
care infrastructures, such as the NHS, are vulnerable to attacks from the digital 
domain. Pacemakers for example, are calibrated wirelessly and have none or very 
little security in place. Medical devices are often limited in their computational and 
communication capabilities; with many being battery powered and tend to be used as 
sensors or actuators (Arney et al. 2011). Such devices are not built to accommodate 
computationally exhaustive operations (Riazul Islam et al. 2015). Similarly, most 
medical devices have low on-device memory, leading to the challenge that they are 
not able to execute complicated security protocols (Riazul Islam et al. 2015). Wireless 
links and open connections, present on medical devices, can also be compromised by 
attackers. Adversaries can then manipulate the data transmitted and received by the 
device, alter dosages, and even turn devices off, potentially putting patients’ lives at 
risk. However, a notable concern is that a successful attack on a medical device, 
presents an opportunity for an attacker to gain backdoor access into a healthcare 
infrastructure. This essentially allows attackers to bypass the network authentication 
infrastructure required to access systems containing sensitive personal data.  
Attacks on medical devices have been steadily increasing over the past 6-12 months; 
these attacks so far appear to be ‘Proof of Concept’ attacks. Their aim is to allow an 
attacker to gain more insight to the security in place on the infrastructure network, 
enabling a more precise and severe attack to be carried out at a later time. These 
attacks are often a challenge to identify, even after the attacks have happened, as there 
is very little monitoring or security available on these devices which track this 
information. 
To address the lack of information about the rise in cyber-attacks on medical devices, 
this research investigates the growing concern of cyber-security for the critical health 
care infrastructure. The project examines the recent increase in attacks on the NHS 
network in particular; and proposes a methodology for visualising real-world network 
data in order to better understand cyber-attacks on healthcare networks.  
In this concept paper, we present a system design and novel methodology to explore 
the use of visualisation techniques in addressing the need for enhanced cyber-security 
measures on healthcare devices. These devices are a known risk for the NHS network. 
The system will also identify how pattern recognition techniques can be used to 
analyse big data sets and find trends in patterns for cyber-attack visualisation purposes 
within the network. 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review of 
health care information systems security and medical device security visualisations. 
Section 3 outlines the approach that will be used on the project, including the aims 
and its novel contributions. Section 4 presents the methodology of the project, the four 
stages of the project, the system design and a discussion of the expected challenges. 
Section 5 is a conclusion of the work in the paper and suggests ways in which the 
project will continue with future work. 
2. Background Research 
Infrastructures are relying increasingly on cyber-physical architectures (Halperin et al. 
2008). The healthcare infrastructure, in particular, is taking advantage of the benefits 
brought through interconnected cyber networks. As such, the interest in medical 
device section has grown in recent years. Medical devices are now essential for 
modern medicine; they allow for automated patient monitoring and management 
functions (Arney et al. 2011)(Health and Social Care Information Centre n.d.). 
Additionally, medical devices are available for continuous use by patients and not 
restricted to within clinical settings. Their interconnectedness is increasing both 
directly and wirelessly to external entities. These factors have the potential to make 
healthcare accessible to everyone and to reduce costs. However, it also provides 
another opportunity for attackers to exploit externally secure networks. 
2.1 The Problem 
Wireless communications and sensor technologies are intrinsically vulnerable. 
Attackers are able to exploit weaknesses, in order to launch attacks. Medical devices, 
which have wireless technology as a core component, need to be secured and private 
otherwise patients would be reluctant to use them. Health-care devices experience 
frequent and unexpected interactions between devices and systems that could 
potentially contain malware (Arney et al. 2011). As these medical devices often have 
no safeguards, they are susceptible to cyber-attacks and buffer overflows. In 
November 2015 the Department of Health commissioned the Health and Social Care 
Information Centre (HSCIC) to develop a Care Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CareCERT) in order to combat this rising risk of cyber threats on health care (Health 
and Social Care Information Centre n.d.). Several devices have been proven to be 
affected in this way, such as Mechanical Ventilators, which have been victims of total 
switch-off and changes in ventilation rates. Other examples include Syringe Pumps, 
which have been completely stopped, External Pacemakers, which have 
malfunctioned, and Renal Replacement Devices, which have also completely stopped 
all due to targeted cyber-attacks (van der Togt et al. 2008). 
Device monitoring systems are highly automated; reducing user involvement in 
deployment, operation and management (Sawand et al. 2014). As such, security is 
crucial for the long term viability of networked medical devices (Arney et al. 2011), 
which have the potential to be tampered with, reprogrammed by unauthorized users or 
subject to device-specific attacks. Devices can be targeted though their firmware 
upgrades or through connections to the network interface when connected through 
remote attacks in addition to local attacks. For example, telemetry data of an 
implantable cardiac defibrillator can be reprogrammed remotely (Halperin et al. 
2008). 
There are obvious direct physical hazards for an attack on a healthcare device. 
However, privacy issues and backdoor access to a larger secure network are also 
significant concerns. Techniques such as ‘eavesdropping’ on the communication links 
make use of medical devices to inject forged data into an externally secure network. 
Additionally, exploiting software vulnerabilities on the medical device monitoring 
system may open the door for attackers and compromise the whole system. Patient 
data can be compromised.  
Similarly, infrastructural systems are transitioning from physical components using 
networked controllers to complete cyber-physical systems (CPS) 
(Venkitasubramaniam et al. 2015). The CPSs rely on the seamless integration of both 
modern communication and modern computation infrastructures with existing 
physical ones. The purpose of which is to far exceed present systems in capability, 
adaptability, durability and efficiency. And CPSs are rapidly approaching the point 
where they are the norm; with nearly 50 million networked as of July 2014 
(Venkitasubramaniam et al. 2015). However the high transfer rate of data exposes 
these systems to security vulnerabilities in cyber communication. These cyber 
vulnerabilities are both critical, yet unfamiliar and rely on the interface between cyber 
and physical architectures (Venkitasubramaniam et al. 2015). The increasing reliance 
on wireless networks is an increasing reliance on a system which is less protected and 
has primitive defences. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) techniques for Medical Cyber Physical Systems 
(MCPSs) are still in their infancy (Mitchell & Chen 2015). Attacks are detected 
through recording state information for both local nodes and peers. This information 
is then updated to a state machine, which models the subject device. This state 
machine generates a detection when state information becomes malicious (Mitchell & 
Chen 2015). In practice, this means that if a heart rate component is reporting normal 
cardiac function, but the Cardiac Device (CD) is in defibrillator mode, then the IDS 
should report a detection instead. Wireless communication security is handled by 
contemporary secret key technology (such as PKI). This provides authentication, 
which prevents man-in-the-middle attacks. 
Figure 1 presents an overview of a typical network infrastructure which enables 
remote access for hospital users. This approach allows doctors, clinicians and support 
staff to provide on-call work remotely. It also demonstrates, how security is external 
facing, has little focus on insider threats. 
 
Figure 1. Remote Access 
Novel vulnerabilities and threats will continue to be introduced due to the dynamic 
nature of the IoT and eHealth devices (Sawand et al. 2014). Cryptography based 
techniques (data encryption or cryptographic protocols) are commonly used to protect 
medical data. However, this is often costly for health care providers (Sawand et al. 
2014). More specifically, Figure 2. Critical Interface Diagram is the data 
infrastructure of a Hospital, showing the data flow process currently in place within 
the network. 
 
Figure 2. Critical Interface Diagram 
2.2 Medical Technology 
In addition to in-body medical devices, patient monitoring systems have cyber-
vulnerabilities of their own. Draeger systems, for example, are medical devices for 
use in patient bedside care, which operate using a custom OS Shell running Windows 
XP/7. The system is currently installed in a number of hospitals throughout the UK 
(Draeger. 2016). This custom Windows shell is known as the Infinity Explorer 
(Draeger. 2016). For system security, the Draeger Omega system (see Figure 3. 
Draeger Technology (Draeger n.d. 2016)) uses Infinity Explorer Security, which is 
both Virus and Intrusion Protection, in addition to a Firewall. At present the majority 
of their systems are outward facing, meaning that they are resistant to external attack 
sources, yet vulnerable to insider attacks. 
Draeger medical devices, including the Omega system, employ the use of a touch 
screen interface and customisable user interface for designed patient/diagnosis 
specific layouts. The intention of Draeger devices, as with most medical devices, is to 
provide the highest quality of patient care, by providing Data Accessibility, Integrity 
and Security. The Draeger ‘Omega’ system runs Windows XP, which is inherently 
vulnerable since it is no longer supported by Microsoft and its vulnerabilities are well 
known to attackers. 
   
Figure 3. Draeger Technology (Draeger n.d. 2016) 
Draeger Infinity Explorer is secured using the following approach: 
 Firstly, the ‘Software Firewall’ mechanism is a security method which prevents 
intrusion and damage to the device and healthcare infrastructure which might be 
introduced through network services. Firewalls are a defence that aims to be 
proactive to damage and virus mitigation. They prevent damage from infection 
and intrusion rather than recover from it after an attack.  
 Secondly, applying Microsoft Hotfixes, also known as QFE’s (Quick Fix 
Engineering) is a mandatory security mechanism for the Infinity Explorer Security 
concept. These patches are analysed when released for applicability to the 
workstation. This is done as Draeger systems are mission-critical software 
systems. However, this does significantly delay their rollout to the devices, as they 
are incorporated into a new release, verified and validated before the customer is 
notified. 
 Thirdly, Draeger Systems have the capability to accept removable media (in the 
case of the Omega system, this is in the form of USB Memory Sticks). The access 
to this file system can be restricted to the administrative user. However access to 
applications, fixed disks and removable disks is restricted to regular windows user 
rights by default, with certain user groups not having the permissions to add or 
delete files on disk. Similarly, booting from removable media can be disabled to 
prevent malicious code being executed on system boot which could potentially 
corrupt the workstation, however this feature needs to be enabled and is not 
enabled by default. 
 Finally, the overall runtime system (the Draeger Watchdog) is a program that 
operates in an environment with regular windows user’s rights with restrictions on 
file system access. The intension of the watchdog is that malicious code 
introduced by an intruder would not be executable under privileged rights. 
Applications available to the watchdog can be included by the administrator to be 
executed. 
As the Infinity Explorer acts as a patient monitor and deals with real-time data it does 
not use antivirus. This is because, the antivirus software would take up resources 
needed by the Draeger Watchdog component. In response, the anti-virus would 
perceive the Watchdog as a virus trying to stop the service, and would subsequently 
attempt to shut down the Watchdog. 
2.3 Related Research 
A similar tool which uses visualisations to increase situational awareness of cyber-
attacks and vulnerabilities is IPMatrix. IPMatrix is a visualization program that can 
find trends in IP Addresses in order to show patterns to allow administrators to predict 
attacks and prevent them (Ohno et al. 2005)(Koike et al. 2005). It’s a simple 
visualization of Attacker IP Addresses, allowing the User to predict potentially 
vulnerable addresses at both site-level and at local level. Additionally IPMatrix3D is a 
piece of software in preliminary development that shows potential in expanding the 
Visualization capabilities of the tool (Koike et al. 2005). The main advantages of 
IPMatrix are that it visualizes IP addresses economically and allows the user to 
intuitively predict the proximity of an attack. However, the tool is limited due to the 
fact that there are unused IP Addresses on the visualization (Ohno et al. 2005). The 
Paper was published over 10 years ago, making its relevance to current work and 
Visualization techniques questionable. 
Virtual Hospitals are occupying an emerging role in eHealth (Ahmed & Akhtar Raja 
2013). Mobile Adhoc Networks (MANETs) in live monitoring and healthcare are 
becoming increasingly important in developing countries. Knowledge Based Systems 
(KBS) for E-Healthcare can enable huge amounts of information to be interacted with 
through the use of intelligent tools (Ahmed & Akhtar Raja 2013). Virtual Hospitals 
reduce the stress of going to a hospital for aged, indisposed or ailing patients. 
Additionally, they allow for ambulance workers to receive guidance from the hospital 
whilst a patient is being brought in for urgent treatment and make it possible for 
hospital staff to make informed and appropriate advanced arrangements for the patient 
(Ahmed & Akhtar Raja 2013). Outsourcing Cloud Services to major providers such as 
Google and Amazon also  relieves hospitals of the burden of major infrastructure and 
maintenance investments (Ahmed & Akhtar Raja 2013). The benefits of Cloud 
Healthcare are outlined in the context of Disaster Response Management (DRM) 
initiatives, allowing rescue workers to communicate with doctors and upload medical 
data for both parties to make informed decisions (Ahmed & Akhtar Raja 2013). The 
emergence of virtual hospitals, along with the increasing reliance on networked 
healthcare solutions, demonstrate that there is a clear need for further cyber security 
solutions to defend against cyber-attacks. Datasets become more valuable and enticing 
to attackers the larger they become and the more that healthcare infrastructures 
depend on them. 
3. Approach 
This project focusses on addressing the issues identified in the background section 
which highlights specific weaknesses within health care information systems and 
devices.  
3.1 Aims 
As such, the aim of this project is to address the cyber-vulnerabilities of medical 
devices, particularly within the NHS critical infrastructure network. The proposed 
research project will develop a system which analyses the data sets from various 
medical devices and employs data analysis and visualisation techniques to identify 
threats and vulnerabilities within healthcare networks. Specifically, the following 
aims for the proposed system are considered. 
 Develop a system which analyses patterns and trends of data within healthcare 
networks. 
 Employ the system to ascertain likely points of entry for attackers. 
 Detecting vulnerabilities within medical devices. 
 Detect compromised medical devices that are behaving erratically and a 
potential threat to the infrastructure as a whole through visualisation 
techniques. 
The benefits of a system that analyses and visualises trends of medical data within the 
Critical Infrastructure are numerous. The system will provide valuable information as 
to where vulnerabilities are within the infrastructure so that solutions can be 
developed to patch them. The system will also allow the developers of medical 
devices to make more informed decisions about the design of their devices in order to 
make them less vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
The key objective of this research project is to develop a system which concerns the 
use of visualisation techniques to communicate complex health-care networks, 
exchange data and converse attack movement.  
3.2 Project Novelties 
The proposed research project will have the following novel contributions: 
 The development of a system which is able to automatically analyse medical 
device data and present it as a visualisation will be novel. The system will allow 
the operator valuable insight into the flow of data within the critical infrastructure 
network and allow patterns and trends to be discerned and potential vulnerabilities 
predicted. The visualization will aid the operator in their situational awareness; 
allowing them to foresee potential cyber vulnerabilities and security risks through 
improved recognition and response to evolving events. From our research to-date, 
no system is able to analyse and visualise healthcare networks in real-time for the 
detection of cyber-threats in medical devices. 
 The system will involve the implementation and development of new algorithms 
in order for the system to identify these complex patterns and readings. In 
addition, the system will make use of a novel application of existing machine 
learning techniques by applying the approach to a healthcare visualisation setting.  
 The system will provide personalised feedback to individual healthcare 
infrastructures networks, meaning the system will be generic and adaptable to 
different healthcare infrastructure environments. 
4.0 Methodology 
In this section, the project methodology is presented. This will include the four stages 
of the project, the proposed system design, and a discussion of the potential 
challenges the project may face. 
4.1 Methodology Stages  
The methodology includes, firstly, the assessment of real world big data sets collected 
from within a healthcare infrastructure. The analysis process has the goal of 
identifying how attacks perform and modelling infrastructure behaviour in high detail.  
The second phase will include the engagement of data visualisation techniques to 
envision both, the generation and effects of cyber-attacks on a network, and the 
changes occurring in a system when an attack is taking place. The output will also be 
used to educate and create awareness between stakeholders and communicate 
knowledge of existing threats in order to improve health care infrastructure security. 
This stage will be evaluated through a target end-user group.  
Thirdly, the expected outcome of the project will be a novel framework for a plug-in 
system capable of autonomously generating visualisations of cyber-attacks and critical 
infrastructure behaviours. As cyber-attacks on medical devices in the Healthcare 
Infrastructures have been increasing within the last six months (BBC 2015), the 
research is timely and directly applicable to a real-world environment. Specifically, 
the system will use data collected from medical devices to analyse patterns of data for 
points of entry from attackers, detect vulnerabilities of medical devices and detect 
medical devices that are behaving erratically and are therefore compromised and pose 
a potential threat. This approach is depicted in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. The Proposed Process 
4.2 System Design 
Figure 5 presents the framework for the proposed system. Real-time data is extracted 
from information systems and processed, through different stages, when it is 
displayed as a visualisation through a user interface. 
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Figure 5. The Proposed Framework 
Each of the components in the framework are explained as follows: 
 Data: The proposed framework includes investigated methods for acquiring 
critical infrastructure attack data for serious game development. The data will 
be acquired from the newly established HSCIC Care Computer Emergency 
Response Team (CareCERT) (Health and Social Care Information Centre  
2016). CareCERT was launched in January 2016 and is funded by the Cabinet 
Office National Security Programme and provides cyber security expertise to 
healthcare organisations in the form of providing information regarding cyber 
vulnerabilities, mitigating risks and advising appropriate reactions to national 
cyber security attacks. 
 Data Processing: This component of the framework processes the data to 
ensure that irrelevant data is removed from the datasets. This will safeguard 
that only pertinent, useful data is included in the analysis stage. 
 Database: The database will store the datasets when not being called on by 
other components of the framework. The database will also store patterns of 
known attack behaviours for the datasets to be compared against. This will 
allow the operator to recognise potentially malicious data and investigate 
further through manipulation of the visualisation. 
 System Control: The system control regulates the operations of the 
visualisation and notifies the data manager to perform data processing 
functions. The system control is required to execute a variety of function, 
which include several key aspects, such as: 
o Instructing the data manager to either start or stop data collection 
o Allowing the operator to input data collection requirements 
o Allowing the operator to manipulate the visualisation of the display in 
order to gain additional perspectives on the data. 
 Visualisation Generation Engine: This component generates visualisations as 
instructed by the system control. The component can accurately and 
effectively showcase the network of information systems and identify data 
relationships and patterns. The visualisation can pinpoint erratic and unusual 
data behaviour within the datasets to assist in cyber-attack detection.  
 UI Output: This is the output shown to the operator. The output increases the 
operator’s situational awareness of the data flow within the information 
systems of the health care infrastructure. 
4.3 Summary 
The seriousness of critical information infrastructure protection is a key issue. Their 
vulnerability to the growing cyber-threat enforces this further. Using the approach put 
forward in the paper to identify system threats within health care networks, a layer of 
security is added to the defence in depth approach currently in place. 
Health care information systems are the most integral component of the health care 
critical infrastructure. Additionally, it is well known that the dangers of cyber-crime 
increase exponentially with the number of interconnected computers and devices. 
Therefore the increasing reliance on medical devices for data capture and transmission 
is an increasing reliance on devices vulnerable to attacks from the cyber domain. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work  
Health care data is an extremely attractive target for a cyber-criminal, the compromise 
of this data could lead to severe loss of patient privacy or the tampering and malicious 
falsifying of data could even lead to patient death. Therefore, unique analysis and 
reporting tools need to be developed to combat the increasing risk of data compromise 
and a focus on cyber security innovations is required to maintain patient trust in 
digital health care innovations.  
In this paper, a framework for a visualisation system to increase situational awareness 
for cyber security experts within health care infrastructures is proposed. Through 
creating a visualisation of data flow of the information systems used in the health care 
infrastructure the system will allow the operator to more accurately predict potential 
cyber vulnerabilities within its systems, cyber-attacks and implement a set of cyber 
security best practices and policies through a unique and novel data analysis and 
visualisation tool. The system will further knowledge and understanding of health 
care information systems and aim to prevent data compromise from within them. 
In our future work, we will begin to design and test the visualisation framework and 
system with simulated data. Once the visualisation has passed initial the 
implementation stage the team will work with industry to ultimately use real-world 
data and analysing its vulnerabilities. 
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